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WILLIAM E. HELLERSTEIN* AND BARBARA A. SHAPIROt
I. INTRODUCTION
apidly growing concern about prisoners' rights and the out-
break of prison disturbances has created a need for the talents
of what might be described as the "Prison-Crisis Lawyer." From
what our own limited experience has taught us, this rapidly de-
veloping practice requires a combination of skills and resources
that cuts across various specializations. An individual attorney or
legal organization confronted with a prison crisis will quickly
discover that prompt and extensive action in many different
spheres is called for and that personal and organizational resources
will be, to say the least, heavily taxed.
A prison crisis may be defined as a situation in which prison
officials respond with unnecessary force or excessive punitive and
retaliatory measures to a prison disturbance or to some other activ-
ity which is viewed by them as a threat to prison security. Indeed,
it has been the immediate aftermath of several major prison dis-
turbances that has given rise to much of the complex litigation to
be discussed herein.' This article will attempt to explore a number
of problems that can occur in the course of dealing with a prison
crisis and to offer some guidelines and suggestions.
Primary emphasis will here be given to litigation under the
Attorney-in-Charge, Criminal Appeals Bureau, Director of Prisoners' Rights Project,
Legal Aid Society of New York City. A.B., Brooklyn College, 1959; J.D., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1962.
t Associate Attorney-in-Charge, Prisoners' Rights Project, Legal Aid Society of New
York City. A.B., Radcliffe College, 1963; LL.B., Columbia University, 1966.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent
those of the Legal Aid Society.
1. The authors have been heavily involved in litigation arising out of three major
prison disturbances: Queens House of Detention for Men at Kew Gardens in October,
1970 (Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)); Long Island City Jail
(Branch Queens) in October, 1970 (Cender v. Lindsay, Civil No. 70-1225 (E.D.N.Y., Nov.
23, 1970)); Attica in September, 1971 (Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility v. Rock-
efeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971)). In addition, the authors are involved in a challenge to
conditions of confinement in the Manhattan House of Detention for Men (the Tombs)
(Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
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federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) since most prisoners'
rights litigation has been undertaken pursuant to that statute.
However, state court remedies and administrative and political
measures, either independently or in conjunction with federal
litigation, should not be overlooked.2
II. GOALS OF LITIGATION
In a crisis situation, because of time pressures, there is a great
temptation to take legal action without advance thought as to the
aims of the suit and techniques to be employed. However, as in
any other kind of litigation, the goals of the lawsuit should be
carefully thought out prior to filing. A suit commenced without
a well-defined goal or theory in mind can become unwieldly and
difficult to manage.
In a prison crisis suit, long range goals may encompass some
attempts at systemic alterations in prison life, but generally, the
litigation will be directed to securing permanent injunctive relief
against various kinds of unlawful official conduct. Thus, in this
type of suit, long range aims will frequently be secondary to the
more immediate necessities-those of obtaining prompt protec-
tion of prisoners from acts of violence and other forms of brutal-
ity; securing adequate medical care; gaining relief from unduly
harsh living conditions imposed in the context of an "emer-
gency"; and thwarting attempts at summary punishment, such as
administrative segregation. The paradox of this type of suit is
that all too often, the goal sought will be nothing more than res-
toration of the status quo as it existed prior to the disturbance.
In a suit brought primarily to challenge extreme punitive
conditions in a prison rather than brutality, a good deal more
attention will have to be paid to achievement of systemic changes
within the prison. Therefore, such a suit may contain an attack on
physical conditions, inadequate medical and psychiatric services,
disciplinary procedures, censorship, visitation rights, and racial
discrimination. Each of these abuses, however, could constitute a
2. Several important suits challenging jail and prison conditions have been success-
fully prosecuted in state courts. Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280
A.2d 110 (1971); Inmates of Wayne County Jail v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs., Civil
No. 173217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., May 25, 1971). As a general matter, however, many state courts
have been exceptionally inhospitable to prisoners' rights suits. See Schwartz, Prisoners'
Rights and the Courts, New York Law Journal, June 10 & 11, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
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compact litigable unit by itself, with its own conceptual base.
Thought should thus be given to whether an omnibus suit
should be brought or whether it would be wiser to commence a
series of actions challenging particular abuses separately. At
times, omnibus suits can result in a hit or miss outcome, where
victory is secured on some points but not others because in the
course of litigation, some become obscured. Asking too much of
a court at one time can be counter-productive. Goals that are
achievable when the court's energies are not diverted by more
serious issues may not be realized when made part of an omnibus
suit. On the other hand, in some cases the constitutional viola-
tions may result from the combination of many factors which,
when viewed separately, might not seem to be of constitutional
magnitude? In such a case, an omnibus suit might well be neces-
sary.
A short-term purpose of crisis lawsuits not to be overlooked
is the potential extra-legal consequence of the very commencement
of the action. Involvement of a court in the crisis as quickly as
possible brings needed exposure of official conduct by requiring
state officials to account for their actions in answering papers or
by testimony at a public hearing. Certain-judges have proceeded
immediately to the prison to hold such hearings and to inspect
the conditions of the prison for themselves.4
Merely bringing the situation within the prison under pub-
lic scrutiny may also have several important long range results.
As the Second Circuit has recently observed:
The tragic events at Attica have deeply affected vital interests
not only of those directly involved, including inmates and correc-
tional personnel, but of the pubic at large. The public wants to
know the facts, with a view to preventing the recurrence of condi-
tions that led to the uprising.5
When the crisis results from an inmate disturbance, success-
ful prosecution of a lawsuit can also legitimize some or all of the
3. This has been particularly true in cases challenging generalized prison conditions
of overcrowding, unsanitary facilities, etc. E.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), afJ'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio
1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, - F.2d -, No. 71-1865 (6th Cir., Mar. 14, 1972);
Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
4. See note 68, infra.
5. Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Inmates of Attica].
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grievances of the inmates and can provide official recognition that
the state has no qualms about engaging in its own brand of un-
lawfulness.
III. SOME THRESHOLD PROBLEMS
A. Resources
Prison crisis litigation requires the type of preparation that
seldom can be accomplished by an individual attorney. Since an
entire or substantial part of an institution is frequently involved,
the task of gathering information alone can be overwhelming.
Institutional defenders are usually best equipped to undertake
this task as they possess the legal manpower and investigative
staff that can be devoted to the project. 6 Much interviewing
of inmates and others is required, as is extensive legal research,
either prior to the commencement of the suit or during its course.
Coalitions of legal organizations can be effective in pooling their
otherwise limited resources The use of law students and para-
professionals should also be given serious consideration.
B. Access
In order to prepare effectively any lawsuit involving opera-
tions within prison walls, it is essential to gain first-hand knowl-
edge of what is going on inside. It should be remembered that in
every prison case, the defendants have immediate access to witnesses
and information often unavailable to plaintiffs' attorneys.
In a post-disturbance suit, the problems of access can be ex-
ceptionally severe.8 Prison officials can be expected to make every
effort to thwart attempts by outsiders to gain entry to the prem-
ises, including those by attorneys. When a request for entry has
6. At present, there is still an absence of available resources in these agencies. Pub.
lic Defender systems throughout the country have barely scratched the surface in the
prisoners' rights area.
7. Coalitions can sometimes present more problems than they solve. Litigation by
committee, especially among groups that may have divergent philosophies and goals, can
be difficult to manage. When undertaken, it is suggested that all participants agree either
formally or informally upon the designation of a chief counsel who will have primary
responsibility for mapping litigation strategies in the absence of time for consultation.
Frequently, the trial judge himself will urge such a designation to facilitate his com-
munication with counsel.
8. After both the Attica disturbance and the death of George Jackson at San Quen-
tin, attorneys' visits were suspended for several days.
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been turned down, there will be little alternative to seeking access
by court order.'
In most other prison suits, however, the difficulties in gain-
ing access are not nearly as severe. Relationships between inmates
and attorneys (especially where institutional defender agencies
are involved) have generally developed in advance of the suit
either by the fact of prior or current representation of the inmate
in his criminal case or through correspondence between the in-
mate and the attorney. Difficulties may occasionally arise only
where, because of physical or personnel limitations, it has been
impossible to obtain the express authorization of the inmates to
commence legal action.'
Members of the State Legislature and other public officials
can also be of assistance in the attempt to gain information as to
what is going on inside the prison. For example, in New York, a
legislator has a statutory right to enter a prison whenever he
wishes 11 and legislators have begun to utilize that right. Attorneys
9. Even with a court order, access may be difficult in extreme situations. In the
Attica case, such an order was obtained. The prison was retaken by exceptional force on
September 13, 1971. That evening, counsel for the inmates obtained, ex parte, a temporary
restraining order from the United States District Court in Buffalo which ordered that
33 named attorneys, together with doctors and nurses accompanying them, be admitted
forthwith to the prison. The order also enjoined any interrogation by state officials of
inmates in the absence of counsel and provided that the State Police were not to inter-
fere with counsel as they were traveling from Buffalo to Attica. Such interference did
not continue after the order was read to the State Troopers. At the prison, however,
admission was refused in the face of the order. The restraining order was vacated
the following day, but two days later, after a National Guardsman testified to having
observed widespread brutality in the prison, correction officials in open court agreed to
permit the attorneys to begin interviewing inmates. It ought not be assumed that all
prison officials will defy a court order as was done at Attica.
10. In the Attica case, the state strenuously contested the right of the legal groups
seeking to represent, the inmates on the ground that they had not been asked by the
inmates to do so. Apart from the fact that time did not permit these amenities, only an
extremely narrow view of the attorney-client relationship can support the pdsition that
an attorney or agency that has represented an inmate as his trial counsel or is represent-
ing him on appeal is not his attorney for purposes of helping him in the aftermath of a
rebellion. The State's position was rejected by the Second Circuit. See Inmates of Attica
at 20-21.
11. N.Y. CoRiuc. LA.w § 500-j (McKinney 1968) provides:
The following persons may visit at pleasure all county jails and workhouses:
the governor and lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, comptroller and attorney-
general, members of the legislature, judges of the court of appeals, justices of the
supreme court and county judges, district attorneys and every minister of the
gospel having charge of a congregation in the town in which such jail or work-
house is located. No other person not otherwise authorized by law shall be per-
mitted to enter the rooms of a county jail or workhouse in which convicts are
confined, unless under such regulations as the sheriff of the county, or in coun-
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for inmates should therefore attempt to work closely with them in
the hope they can provide a vital source of information. Not infre-
quently, legislators have furnished supporting affidavits and have
testified as plaintiffs' witnesses as to their observations. In simi-
lar fashion, members of the press should not be overlooked as yet
another source of vital information and possible eyewitness testi-
mony.12 Members of the clergy can also be helpful.
IV. PREPARATION OF THE COMPLAINT
In a prison crisis, attorneys may have to go into court on the
basis of a very hastily prepared complaint. 3 Although it will not
be possible under such circumstances to do the kind of factual
and legal preparation that usually precedes the filing of a com-
plaint in federal court, it must be remembered that the complaint
will tend to determine the subsequent course of the litigation.
Things added or omitted in haste may require extensive amend-
ments to the pleadings, and may delay or confuse the litigation.
However, due to lack of time for preparation of the complaint, it
will frequently be necessary to take advantage of the statutory
right to amend the complaint at least once. 4
A. The Plaintiffs
The first consideration in drafting pleadings is whether the
suit should be brought as a class action. In most prison crisis liti-
gation, such a large number of inmates will be involved that a
class action under Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure will be appropriate.
The courts have held that inmates may bring class actions
against prison officials in a variety of situations. Class actions
ties within the city of New York, the commissioner of correction of such city, or
in the county of Westchester, the commissioner of correction of such county,
shall prescribe.
12. In Cender v. Lindsay, Civil No. 70-1225 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 1970), news photog-
raphers took photographs of beatings of inmates by correction officers which were used
in the federal lawsuit and also figured prominently in subsequent official investigations
into the conduct of the guards.
13. In fact, in Inmates of Attica, Federal Judge John Curtin issued the order de-
scribed in supra note 9 before a complaint had been filed, on the basis of the emergency
situation.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In an attempt to ameliorate the difficulties created by
hasty drafting of pleadings, the Prisoner's Rights Newsletter has developed a "bank"
containing briefs, memoranda, model complaints and other litigation aids for use by
attorneys and inmates who plan to file such lawsuits.
PRISON CRISIS LITIGATION
against widespread and unchecked brutality by prison officials, 5
or by other inmates and inmate trustees 18 have been sustained.
Class actions have also been deemed proper in prisoners' rights,
cases involving corporal punishment,17 racial segregation -18 and
general prison conditions. 19 Similarly, the use of class actions in
cases involving widespread police misconduct has also been up-
held.20 However, class actions may be disallowed where the claims
of each inmate rest on a distinct set of facts or where there exists
a substantial conflict of interest among various members of the
proposed class.2'
A class action has many advantages in prison crisis litigation.
The most obvious is that any relief obtained will protect all mem-
bers of the class, not just a few selected clients. A class action will
prevent the prison administration from rendering the case moot
merely by transferring or giving special treatment to the indi-
vidual plaintiffs.22 If the case is brought on behalf of the entire
class of inmates, the attorney will be given free access to all mem-
bers of the class, 23 thereby avoiding difficulties that might other-
wise arise in trying to interview potential parties or witnesses.24
15. Inmates of Attica; Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 1,
1971).
16. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
17. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
18. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 US. 333 (1968).
19. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub noma. Jones v.
Metzger, - F.2d -, No. 71-1865 (6th Cir., Mar. 14, 1972); Rhem v. McGrath, Civil No.
70-3962 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 1970); Inmates of the Cook County Jail v. Tierney, Civil No.
68-504 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 22, 1968) (oral opinion, transcript, at 7). See also Goodwin v. Os-
wald, Civil No. 71-388 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 16, 1972) (correspondence rules).
20. BUILD of Buffalo v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971); Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
21. In Inmates of Attica at 24, it was held that there could be no class action
concerning interrogation by a special prosecutor investigating the riot when the proposed
class included potential defendants, potential prosecution witnesses, and possibly unin-
volved inmates.
22. Transfer or release of the named plaintiffs in a class action does not make the
case moot. E.g., Inmates of the Cook County Jail v. Tierney, Civil No. 68-504 (N.D. Ill.,
Aug. 22, 1968); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), af'd, 390 U.S. 333
(1968); Ferguson v. Buchanan, Civil No. 64-107 (S.D. Fla., Mar. 12, 1965). In Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968) the named plaintiff in a class action to end
employment discrimination on the basis of race was allowed to continue as the repre-
sentative party even after he had been promoted out of the class.
23. Inmates of Attica; Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 8, 1970).
24. For example, in prisons in New York State an inmate can normally be inter-
viewed only by an attorney who already represents him or from whom he has requested
legal assistance in writing.
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Additionally, when a suit is declared a class action, the members
of the class must be notified of the suit and of the names and ad-
dresses of the plaintiffs' attorneysY5 Once the inmates are thus
notified of the class action, they will be able to correspond with
the attorneys for the class.2"
There may, on the other hand, be certain disadvantages to a
class action which should be considered. Litigation of the case,
including the class action question itself, may be more time con-
suming than trying an action for individual plaintiffs only.2 7 This
will be a problem especially where personal injuries must be
proved in a damage action. There may also be serious manage-
ment problems in maintaining a class action in a large prison.
The attorney for the class may receive voluminous correspon-
dence from inmates on matters not pertinent to the class action.
In sum, however, the advantages of a class action far outweigh the
disadvantages except possibly where damages are sought. There-
fore, suits for injunctive relief should be brought as class actions
whenever possible.
In drafting a class action complaint, the statutory require-
ments of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must
be kept in mind.s However, particular attention should be given
to those problems which are most likely to arise in a crisis situa-
tion. For example, an issue may be raised as to whether there are
questions of law and fact common to the class, 29 whether the
claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of
25. FT. R. Civ. P. 23(c) requires notice to all members of a class under 23(b)(3).
However, it has been held that due process requires notice in all class actions. Mullane
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968); Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 1,
1971); Rhem v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-3962 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 1970).
26. In Valvano v: McGrath, the notice to the inmates informed them that they
could write to the attorneys for either side. They were also allowed to address letters
to the court, with instructions as to which attorneys should receive the letter, if they
wanted to prevent anyone in" the prison from learning the destination of the letter.
27. Of course, an evidentiary hearing on a motion for preliminary relief need not
be postponed until after the determination of the class action issue. Evidentiary hearings
were held prior to the class action determinations in both Inmates of Attica and Valvano.
28. The complaint should allege that the proposed class meets all the requirements
of FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(a) and the requirements of at least one subdivision of 23(b). De-
marco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Preston, 352 F.2d 352, 354
n.10 (9th Cir. 1965); Hickey v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 278 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960); Lunch v. Kenston School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 229 F. Supp.
740 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
29. Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
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the class,30 and whether the named parties will fairly and ade-
quately represent the class.3 The interpretations of the require-
ments of Rule 23 (a) (2), (3) and (4) vary from case to case, and
tend to overlap to a large extent.2 Attacks upon the propriety of
the class under these sections generally resolve themselves into
two basic questions. First, do the acts complained of affect, or are
they likely to affect, all inmates? Second, to what extent will the
relief sought by the named plaintiffs be beneficial to or desired
by the other inmates? 38
In cases involving brutality or other unconstitutional use of
force, not all the inmates in the institution will have been sub-
jected to such conduct. Nevertheless, if the brutality or force has
been inflicted upon a large number of inmates and there is a
continued threat or possibility of such action against the rest of
the inmate population, a class action for injunctive relief can be
maintained.3 4 Of course, if it had to be shown that the constitu-
tional rights of all members of the class had already been vio-
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
31. FFD. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
32. For example, it has been held that the requirement of rule 23(a)(2) is virtually
identical to that of 23(a)(3). American Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 44
F.R.D. 47 (N.D. Okla. 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D.
Minn. 1968). Rule 23(a)(4) has been held to require consideration of whether the interests
of the named parties are coextensive with those of the class, whether they are antago-
nistic to the interests of other class members, the percentage of the class named as
plaintiffs, and other factors. Advertising Speciality Nat'l Ass'n. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
288 F.2d 108, 119-20 (1st Cir. 1956). Other courts have held that less is required by
23(a)(4), looking mainly to whether or not the named parties will prosecute the case
vigorously. Eisen v. Carlisle 8: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968); Mersay v.
First Repub. Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
33. However, in one case, the opposition to the class action was on totally different
grounds. It was argued that declaring the case a class action would require notice to the
members of the class, and that the distribution of notice of the pending action concern-
ing jail conditions would create a security risk. The case was declared a class action and
notice ordered nevertheless. Rhem v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-3962 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 1970).
34. Inmates of Attica at 24 n.11; Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jackson
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). The individual situations of all members of the
class need not be identical. The requirements of 23(a) generally have been liberally con-
strued in this regard in favor of allowing individuals to bring class actions, particularly in
civil rights cases. E.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1969); Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969) (news photographer on be-
half of all news media personnel); Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395
F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968);
Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th
Cir. 1963); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969);
Broughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Ala. 1969); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005
(N.D. Ga. 1968), afJd, 393 U.S. 266 (1964 (suit to desegregate correctional institutions).
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lated, the value of the injunction as a preventive remedy would
be destroyed.
A different situation might be presented if the plaintiffs, in
addition to seeking injunctive relief against brutality, also seek
damages for personal injury on the same factsY5 Unless the dam-
age claims arise from similar acts against a large number of in-
mates, a class damage action would not be advisable. Of course, an
action may be maintained as a class action for injunctive relief
while damage claims are maintained only on behalf of the named
plaintiffs 0
Although Rule 23 (a) has been liberally construed to allow
class actions, there may be cases in which the interests of the
named plaintiffs are so antagonistic to those of other members of
the class that a class action will not be allowed. 7 For example, in
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller a  it was
held that the interests of inmates who expected to be indicted as
a result of the riot, and those who were not involved or who might
cooperate with the prosecution, were sufficiently antagonistic to
defeat a class action for an injunction against official interroga-
tions.
If the interests of the named plaintiffs are not antagonistic to
those of other members of the class, there is no need to establish
that all, or even a majority, of the inmates actually support the
action. 9 Class actions have been allowed even though a few mem-
35. Class damage suits have been allowed in other contexts under rule 23(b)(3). Eg.,
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d
138 (6th Cir. 1968); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.
Ind. 1968). Class damage suits have been preferred when individual suits would have been
more time consuming, Minnesota v. U.S. Steel, 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968), although
in other class actions the amount of damages had to be determined separately for each
individual. American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155, 157
(N.D. Ill. 1969). See Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 78 (ED. Pa., 1970) (a
class action may be proper in a personal injury case).
36. The use of subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4) should also be considered in this context.
37. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968). (Inmates of work camps could
not bring a class action to abolish work camps because some other inmates might prefer
work camps to the penitentiary.) See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Mc-
Arthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340 (1884); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp,, 419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Mersay v. First Repub. Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
38. 453 F.2d at 24.
39. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Assn. Inc., 414 F.2d 311, 317 (1st Cir. 1969); Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 n.7 (2d. Cir., 1968) ("[a] class action should not be
denied merely because every member of the class might not be enthusiastic about enforcing
his right.").
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bers of the plaintiff class have testified for the defendants, ° or
have objected to the action.4
In an action for injunctive relief, prison inmates as a class will
generally satisfy the requirements of both 23 (b) (2) 42 and 23
(b) (3). 43 In such a situation it should be considered a suit under
23 (b) (2)'4 so that the judgment will be binding on all members
of the class.45
B. The Defendants
In determining who are to be the defendants, attention must
be given to the question of who is directly or indirectly responsi-
ble for causing the acts complained of and who has the power to
remedy any conduct or conditions which are the subject of the
complaint. Any state or local official, such as the prison warden,
the commissioner of correction, state judge or the governor can
be joined as defendants if he or she has any power or duty to take
corrective action. Thus, in Rhem v. McGrath,6 the court, most
significantly, held:
40. In Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390, at 15-18 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 11, 1971)
several inmates testified on behalf of the defendants at the first hearing on a motion for
preliminary relief.
41. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 315-16 (1st Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970) (share of recovery due each member of class subject to dis-
pute); Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969); Coskery v. Roberts & Mander
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 189 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1951) (owners of
1,600 shares out of 330,000 opposed to the action). But see Fitzgerald v. Jandreau, 16
F.R.D. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2) provides for a class action when:
The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ....
43. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) provides for a class action when:
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concern-
ing the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
44. Inmates of Attica at 24; Rhem v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-3962 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26,
1971); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Technograph Printed
Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
45. In Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 21, 1971), the court
allowed inmates to "opt out" of the class to bring individual damage suits even though it
was a properly constituted class under rule 23 (b)(2).
46. Civil No. 70-3962 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 16, 1971).
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[W]hen conditions are permitted to exist which have the effect of
violating a person's constitutional rights, the official charged with
responsibility for those conditions has a constitutional obligation
to alleviate those conditions, whether his statutory power to act be
cast in terms of discretion or duty.
4 7
In general, unless money damages are sought from individual
prison guards, there is no reason to name them as defendants if
the warden has been named. An injunction against the warden
will be binding on all prison employees.4 8 However, if enforce-
ment against any of the warden's superiors or any other state offi-
cials is desired, such officials should be named in the complaint.
It is possible that the state or a municipal or county government
may also be added as a party defendant for injunctive relief.40
Even if damages are sought, it may be possible to add the
state (or county or municipality) as a party defendant. Although
42 U.S.C. §1983 does not, by itself, authorize recovery of damages
from governmental bodies, 50 it has been held that damages can be
recovered under §1983 to the extent that there has been a waiver
of immunity. 1 In addition, a pendent state law tort claim against
47. Id. at 34. See also BUILD of Buffalo v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284, 288 (2d Cir. 1971). A
careful check of state statutes may reveal that a substantial number of state and local
officials can be joined as defendants. E.g., N.Y. CoREc. LAw § 504 (McKinney 1968) (presid-
ing justice of Appellate Division in cases involving New York City jails).
48. FED. R. Cxv. P. 65(d) provides:
Every order granting an injunction . . . is binding only upon the parties to
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of
the order by personal service or otherwise.
Cf. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 US. 9, 14 (1944).
49. A number of courts have held that injunctive relief cannot be granted against a
municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. E.g., Patrum v City of Greensburg, Ky., 419 F.2d 1300
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970); United States ex rel. Gittiemacker v.
County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970);
Wallach v. City of Pagedale, 359 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1966); Spampinato v. City of New
York, 311 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 980 (1963). Other courts have al-
lowed such injunctive suits under § 1983. E.g., Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 439
F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1971); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 321-23 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, Okla., 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961). See generally
Comment, Injunctive Relief Against Municipalities Under Section 1983, 119 U. PA. L. Rv.
389 (1970).
50. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
51. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 368-70 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub norn.
District of Columbia v. Carter, No. 71-564 (U.S., Jan. 10, 1972); McArthur v. Pennington,
253 F. Supp. 420, 430 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). But see Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 92 S. Ct. 1190 (1972).
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the state or municipality and the responsible individuals may be
added to the complaint. 5
C. Damages
In drafting a complaint in a prison crisis, a determination
will have to be made as to whether or not to sue for damages.
Damages can be awarded for violations of constitutional rights by
prison officials.53 However, the amount of the recovery may be
limited to compensatory damages, 54 which in most cases will not
be great, particularly since inmates get free medical care and do
not have any substantial income to lose as a result of injury or
illness. Yet a small damage award may be very important to an
inmate because of his indigency, and should not be minimized by
comparison with a free citizen who has been slightly injured.
There are some strategic advantages to requesting damages.
The damage claim will remain viable even if the claim for in-
junctive relief is rendered moot by the remedial actions of the
defendants. If damages are finally recovered, either from individu-
als or from the state, the deterrent effect may be as significant as
injunctive relief in the long run. Finally, the named plaintiffs
may want damages, and failing to claim damages in the federal
suit may bar them from recovering damages in any other man-
ner.
55
On the other hand, there may be serious disadvantages to add-
ing damage claims. An attorney pursuing such a claim may find
52. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (the pendent claim
and the federal claim must "derive from a common nucleus of operative facts."); Price
v. United Mine Workers, 336 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1964) (pendent state punitive damages claim
in suit under federal labor-management laws); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R. Co., 331
F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1964) (state damage claim joined with federal claim under the Railway
Labor Act). The pendent state claim need not be for the requisite jurisdictional amount
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Wilson v. American Chain &c Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966);
Stewart v. Shanahan, 227 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1960); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Owens-
boro Milling Co., 222 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1955). The defendant in the pendent claim need
not be a defendant in the federal claim as long as the state claim can be joined under the
rule of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx,
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
53. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1971); Wright v. McMann, 387
F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969), aff'd, -
F.2d -, 9 Cnms. L. REP. 2052 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 10 CRIM. L. REP.
4011 (Oct. 13, 1971).
54. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971); Wright v. McMann, 321 F.
Supp. 127, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, - F.2d - (2d Cir., Mar.
26, 1972).
55. Cf. Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 at 6 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 21, 1971).
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himself in the position of having to litigate separately the damage
claims for each of the named plaintiffs. Litigation of a damage
claim also may require considerable time and substantial expendi-
tures for discovery, with only a small chance of a meaningful
financial recovery.5
D. Scope of the Complaint
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a simplified
form of pleading.57 However, in pleading violations of prisoners'
rights under the eighth amendment, relatively detailed pleadings
may be required. To state a cause of action for injunctive relief
under the eighth amendment it is necessary to allege both the
original violation (such as beatings, unnecessary force and vio-
lence) and facts which show that there is a real danger of con-
tinued or renewed violations (recurrent beatings, harassment,
threats, verbal abuse, lack of affirmative action on the part of re-
sponsible officials). 58 If it is claimed that the conditions of con-
finement are so inhuman as to violate the eighth amendment,
enough must be alleged to establish an overall picture of constitu-
tional deprivation.5 9
In drafting a complaint for prisoners in this type of case, there
may be a temptation to include a wide range of possibly unconsti-
tutional acts or practices. Claims such as unwarranted confiscation
of personal property, routine and harassing "strip searches," 10
mail censorship, lack of special diets or religious services for
groups such as Black Muslims, arbitrary discipline, unsanitary
56. There are still relatively few cases in which prisoners have been awarded damages.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971) ($25 a day for 372 days of unlawful
segregation); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1970), modified en banc, No.
28971 (Mar. 3, 1972); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) ($1500); Rob-
erts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969) ($85,000 for negligence resulting in
blindness and possible brain damage).
57. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all that is re-
quired is "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief ...." See also BUILD of Buffalo v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971).
58. Cf. Inmates of Attica at 22-23; Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 at 26.29
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 11, 1971); Cender v. Lindsay, Civil No. 70-1225 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 1970).
59. In cases in which conditions have been held unconstitutional, the courts have
relied on a combination of a large number of specific factors which individually might not
violate the eighth amendment. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, -
F.2d -, No. 71-1865 (6th Cir., Mar. 14, 1972).
60. "Strip searches" are thorough body searches (which often include a rectal examina-
tion) of inmates, often conducted before and after court appearances or visits, including
attorney visits, and at other times as well.
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conditions, and inadequate medical care may be made by the in-
mates. However, addition of a large number of these claims, some
of which cannot easily be proved, may detract from the likelihood
of success on the issues that are of a crisis nature.
Since it can be very difficult to check the information an at-
torney receives from his clients, great care should be taken in
making factual allegations in the complaint. Some of the infor-
mation received may be rumor or hearsay; it may be difficult to
find an eyewitness willing or able to testify to events that many
inmates have described to the attorney.
Finally, in a post-disturbance situation, great care must be
taken not to set forth information which might tend to incrimi-
nate any plaintiff. A suggested approach to this problem is to
confine the allegations and claims of the complaint strictly to post-
disturbance events. It should be remembered that plaintiffs are
subject to pretrial discovery concerning all allegations in the
complaint.
V. TRYING THE ISSUES
The nature of prison crisis litigation renders motion practice
of crucial importance. Certainly where urgent relief is needed,
as is most often the case in a post-disturbance suit, a trial on the
merits may be too late to be very effective."
In virtually every prison crisis situation, the first important
motion will be an application for a temporary restraining order
seeking immediate access to the institution and cessation of any
brutality. Under Rule 65 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, such an order may be granted without notice to one's
adversary only if two conditions are met. It must clearly appear
from facts set forth in an affidavit or verified complaint that im-
mediate and irreparable injury will occur before the other side
can be heard. The applicant's attorney must also certify to the
court in writing the efforts that have been made, if any, to contact
the other side, and why notice should be dispensed with. As a
practical matter, most judges will insist or request that defend-
61. Counsel should also be aware of Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which states that "[b]efore or after the commencement of the hearing of an applica-
tion for a preliminary injuction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits
to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application."
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ant's counsel be given informal notice. Since defendant's counsel
will usually be the State Attorney General, City Corporation
Counsel or County Attorney, this should not be difficult.
A problem that will arise in the preparation of initial papers
is that much of the information that would bolster supporting
affidavits may be obtainable only after access to the institution is
granted. However, there is usually little time to worry about this
dilemma, and supporting affidavits from attorneys reciting what
they have learned from other sources have been sufficient in some
cases.6 When an attorney's affidavit is all that is submitted, it
should be as specific as possible, setting forth the nature of the
abuses complained of and the manner of their occurrence, includ-
ing references to times and places. Whenever available, affidavits
from inmates or other eyewitnesses should be obtained.
The application for a temporary restraining order must be
accompanied by a complaint. However, in an extreme emergency
it is possible that a court will act before a complaint has been
filed.63 Even if a temporary restraining order is granted, a motion
for a preliminary injunction will have to be made. Counsel should
press for an immediate evidentiary hearing on that motion. The
court must grant a hearing whenever there is an actual dispute
as to the facts.64
The hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction
should be approached with the greatest of seriousness. The plain-
tiffs must meet
the burden of showing probable success on the merits and some
irreparable injury or, where the showing of probable success is un-
certain, that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in their favor.05
In establishing irreparable injury, the key factor is whether "there
is some cognizable danger of recurrent violation." 60 The mere
62. See supra note 9. In Cender v. Lindsay, Civil No. 70-1225 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 1970),
the application for a temporary restraining order was based upon radio and newspaper re-
ports of brutality.
63. In Inmates of Attica, the temporary restraining order was issued before a com-
plaint was filed. See supra note 9.
64. SEC v. Frank, 888 F.2d 486, 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1968); Hawkins v. Board of Control,
253 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1958); City Line Center, Inc. v. Loews, Inc., 178 F.2d 267 (3d
Cir. 1949); Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947).
65. Inmates of Attica at 20; Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319,
323 (2d Cir. 1969); Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 389 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968); Dino DeLau-
rentiis Cinematografica, S.p.A. v. D-150, Inc., 266 F.2d 373, 374-75 (2d Cir. 1966).
66. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 545 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). See also NLRB. v.
Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25 (1970); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963). ,
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cessation of the practice or action complained of after the filing of
the lawsuit will not itself justify the denial of relief.1
7
There are a number of important tactical determinations to
be made concerning the actual conduct of the hearing. One is the
location of the hearing. An effort should be made to persuade the
judge to either visit the prison or to conduct some part of the hear-
ing at the prison. 8 There may be competing factors as to the
wisdom or desirability of having any part of the hearing at the
institution. There exists the possibility that inmate witnesses may
be intimidated by the immediate surroundings, especially if cor-
rection officers are permitted to remain in the hearing room. The
warden will urge that security so requires. The court should be
persuaded to exclude as many correction officers from inside the
room as possible, particularly those who may be directly involved
in the lawsuit. The use of federal marshals to maintain security
should be urged as a reasonable alternative, with the correction
officers maintaining their posts outside the hearing room. On the
other hand, the judge's presence at the prison for part of the hear-
ing may have a stabilizing effect. It may underscore the serious-
ness of the lawsuit and provide the inmates with additional
assurance that their grievances are being given serious considera-
tion.
Skill in the selection of witnesses and presentation of evi-
dence is also of great importance. Prison crisis suits will always
involve large numbers of potential witnesses-inmates, correction
officials and others. First, efforts should be made to present what-
ever non-inmate witnesses are available if they have firsthand in-
formation, especially members of the press, clergy or legislature.
Courts may be suspicious of prisoner testimony,69 and corrobora-
•67. Inmates of Attica; Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966);
Strasser v. Doorley, 309 F. Supp. 716 (D.R.I. 1970); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1968). But see Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970); Valvano v. McGrath,
325 F. Supp. 408, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
68. There is a growing body of precedent for this procedure: Arif v. McGrath,
Civil No. 71-1888 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 1971); Valvano v. McGrath, 825 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.
N.Y. 1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Counsel should be
alert to thwart efforts to give the judge only the "Red Cross tour"-where prison officials
seek to show only those parts of the institution that will reflect favorably on their
conduct.
69. An interesting contrast is presented in the court's decision in Valvano, vacating
the findings of a magistrate whom the court had designated to take testimony and make
factual findings on the issue of post-riot brutality. The only witnesses called by plaintiffs
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tion by independent sources such as non-inmate testimony and
prison disciplinary and medical records will be quite helpful.
An attempt should also be made to obtain as witnesses a wide
cross section of the prison population. In addition to ethnic fac-
tors,70 the inmate's criminal record, age, location in the institu-
tion, job status, prison disciplinary record and articulateness or
the lack of it should all be considered.
71
Inmates called as plaintiffs' witnesses are in a delicate posi-
tion and every effort must be made to protect their personal in-
terests. First, every prisoner must be warned that his testimony
may lead to reprisals by prison officials, especially correction offi-
cers in whose immediate custody he is confined. Although courts
are becoming increasingly sensitive to this danger,7 2 the inmate
should also be apprised that he cannot be fully protected against
all future harassment in retaliation. A pretrial detainee must be
advised that his being a witness could have an adverse effect on his
criminal case, particularly in plea negotiations and at sentence. 3
A convicted prisoner should be forewarned of the risk of an ad-
verse effect upon his prison assignment or parole status. 4
were inmates whose testimony was totally rejected by the magistrate. The court wrote:
Where all the witnesses on one side have been considered untruthful and
all the witnesses on the other side have been considered credible, it is almost
inevitable that the conclusion is mistaken at least in part.
The Special Master appears to have given considerable weight to the fact
that plaintiffs' witnesses had prior felony convictions and many had records of
addiction. A trial judge knows that the government frequently relies on convicts
and addicts to prove its case and that juries frequently believe their testimony
beyond a reasonable doubt, depending on the independent corroboration or im-
peachment that may be provided by documentary evidence and other oral tes-
timony.
Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 at 24 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 11, 1971).
70. Inmate differences may follow racial patterns or a prison disturbance may be
blamed by the authorities on a particular ethnic or religious group. For example, where
a major role in a prison disturbance is attributed to the black population, supportive
testimony from white inmates can be persuasive.
71. An inmate's inability to express himself may add to, rather than detract from
his credibility. Preparation of inmate testimony will be greatly facilitated if, from the
outset, a separate file is maintained for each inmate interviewed.
72. Inmates of Attica at 23. "The situation here is unique in that plaintiffs, being
prisoners, are at the mercy of their keepers."
73. A pretrial detainee's criminal lawyer should always be contacted prior to his
participation in the suit.
74. In Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court sought to
protect those who testified by enjoining the defendants "from forwarding any informa.
tion to any other penal institution or employee thereof concerning any testimony given
in court by any inmates, or any involvement in this lawsuit or the making of any
charges against any Correction Officer." Id. at 411.
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The inmate's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation must also be protected zealously prior to his taking the
stand and throughout the course of his testimony. The trial judge
should be asked to restrict the scope of cross-examination to pre-
clude inquiry into pending criminal charges or involvement in
possible criminal conduct during a prison disturbance. In both
Valvano v. McGrath and the Attica case, the district court pre-
cluded cross-examination along these lines.
If parties or witnesses report that they are being harassed and
intimidated, application should promptly be made to the court
for their protection. A federal court has plenary power to take all
steps necessary to safeguard its fact-finding processes, including
the transfer of inmates confined in state or municipal facilities to
federal custody during the course of the proceedings. 75 A court
can even enjoin state criminal prosecutions if they are instituted
in bad faith in order to intimidate parties or witnesses.76
In preparing a large number of witnesses in a short time,
particular care should be taken to guard against conflicting testi-
mony. Inmates will frequently describe events on the basis of
hearsay or rumor rather than upon firsthand observation. It
should be remembered that inmates' freedom of movement and
thus opportunity for observation is limited by the very nature of
their confinement. As a result, there may be serious variances in
the descriptions of events especially in the tense atmosphere of a
75. This was done in the Valvano case. Cf. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th
Cir. 1944). In addition, the court in Valvano ordered:
I. That the defendants take all reasonable steps to assure the safety of all
inmates who have given statements to representatives of either side in this action,
or have been interviewed by representatives of either side or have testified in
court in this proceeding, or who may testify in any other action or proceeding
arising out of the disturbance of October 2 to 4, 1970 or out of this action.
II. That the defendants and all Correction Officers and other personnel in
Queens House of Detention for Men are restrained until further order of the
court from making any threats against any person who has been interviewed or
has given a statement or testified as set forth above.
III. That all inmates of Queens House of Detention for Men are restrained
until further order of the court from making any threats against any person who
has been interviewed or has given a statement or testified as set forth above.
325 F. Supp. at 411.
76. The Supreme Court's decisions in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), and Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82 (1971) should not be considered obstacles to the court's issuing any injunction
which is necessary to protect essential witnesses and parties, and thereby to "protect its
jurisdiction" under 28 U.S.C. § 2283. See the discussion of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965) in Younger v. Harris, supra at 47-54.
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crisis. Consequently, as much time and resources as possible
should be devoted to the checking out of information before it is
offered in court.
To prove an affirmative case at the preliminary injunction
hearing, it will often be necessary to call prison officials. Absent
time for extensive discovery, the examination of prison officials
requires exceptional caution. Direct examination of prison offi-
cials should generally focus on what is being done to remedy the
conduct or conditions which are the subject of complaint. How-
ever, prison officials may frequently disclaim any knowledge of
unlawful conduct. Any conduct that is admitted will undoubtedly
be defended on the grounds that it is necessary to the maintenance
of prison "security." However, if the witness does not provide a
more specific explanation of the conduct, it will subject his broader
representations to doubt. Of course, he should be held to any
specific representations he has ventured to make.
At the hearing, the defendants may seek to refute plaintiffs'
case in several ways. They may rely solely on cross-examination of
plaintiffs' witnesses or they may decide to call their own wit-
nesses, including other inmates. Prison officials may attempt to
exploit disunity among the inmate population. Possible bias of
an inmate witness against the plaintiffs should be explored. Prison
officials may offer inducements to inmates in exchange for favora-
ble testimony. Such inducements might include preferred treat-
ment within the institution, especially in job assignments; special
consideration from the parole board; or offers to secure the dis-
trict attorney's or the court's leniency in the inmate's criminal
case. 77 Thus any inmate called by the defendants should be
severely examined on the subject of inducements and the records
in his criminal case should be checked.
The defendants may also call prison officials and guards.
Much of the testimony will be based on their own "expertise"
and the need for prison "security." The "expertise" of each wit-
ness should be closely scrutinized. He may lack familiarity with
the rules, regulations and operations manuals that govern the in-
77. In Valvano, the court noted that an inmate who testified for the defendants was
permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty to manslaughter in the second degree and to
plead instead to criminally negligent homicide with a sentence to time served. See Valvano
v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 at 24a (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 11, 1971).
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stitution. Lower level correction officers can be especially vulner-
able to this type of examination since many have had limited
training and may have spent little time reading the requirements
of their own positions. Moreover, prison rules and regulations
may be incomplete or contradictory. "Expertise" can also be chal-
lenged in the traditional manner by examination of the individu-
al's background and credentials. Lastly, cross-examination may
demonstrate that the issue in question has no relationship to the
witness' proferred "expertise."
Particular attention should be paid to witnesses who have a
special responsibility in connection with investigating the cir-
cumstances of a disturbance or charges of misconduct by prison
guards. Examination of such officials should explore the possi-
bility of conflicts of interest between their official responsibilities
and their role as witnesses.
On occasion, it may also appear that the attorney for the
defendants is vested with the responsibility of prosecuting prison
personnel for misconduct. This type of conflict of interest has
drawn comment from at least one federal court.7
A. Preliminary Relief
Various kinds of preliminary relief can be granted by the
court in addition to an injunction against brutality or other fla-
grant constitutional violations. The court's order might include
provisions for the enforcement of the injunction. For example,
the court can provide for free access to all inmates by both attor-
neys and law students or paraprofessionals in their employ7 9 The
court can appoint monitors 10 or it might order the temporary
suspension or reassignment of particular correction officers.,,
The court can also order that inmates be released from punitive
78. Id. at 6.
79. Arif v. McGrath, Civil No. 71-1388 at 21-23 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 1971).
80. Inmates of Attica at 25 (holding that the district court should consider the
use of federal monitors to enforce its injunction against brutality and harassment); Val-
vano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408, 411-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (requesting the New York City
Board of Correction to serve as monitors and report to the court).
81. Cf. Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-1390 at 29-30, 34-45 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 11,
1971), where the defendants were ordered to begin independent departmental prosecutions
of correction officers alleged to have been involved in acts of brutality against inmates.
See also Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
932 (1971).
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segregation or solitary confinement unless they are given hearings
on disciplinary charges.8 -
However, in dealing with a crisis, it must be kept in mind
that some concessions to post-crisis security may have to be made.
For example, it has been held that a 24 hour lockup of prisoners
for a period of several weeks following a riot is permissible as
long as there are plans to return to normal at some time.83 It has
also been held that prison officials can temporarily isolate sus-
pected "trouble makers" without any formal proceedings."
Prison officials may also be granted a reasonable period of time
to restore exercise and other normal privileges following a riot or
disturbance. 5 In general, where a strong argument is made that
restoration of privileges will create a "security" risk, courts will
hesitate before ordering an immediate return to pre-riot proce-
dures.
Much of what we have discussed so far is also applicable to a
trial on the merits. However, as in most federal litigation, the
liberal provisions for pretrial discovery should be fully utilized.
In prison crisis litigation, discovery will normally be directed to
the following items: institutional disciplinary records of both in-
mates and guards; unpublished rules and regulations; medical rec-
ords; criminal records of defendants' witnesses. Where actual
conditions are in issue, a motion to inspect and photograph all
parts of the prison should be made under Rule 34.8o Detailed
interrogatories, requests for admissions and extensive depositions
into all aspects of prison management may also be called for.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS
Federal courts have repeatedly exercised their jurisdiction in
the area of prisoners' rights 87 and it is well established that they
82. Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F.
Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y 1970). But see Inmates of Greenhaven v. Zelker, Civil No. 71,4676
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 15, 1971). See also Nieves v. Oswald, Civil No. 1971-526 (W.D.N.Y.. filed
Nov. 16, 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
83. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
84. Inmates of Greenhaven v. Zelker, Civil No. 71-4676 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 15, 1971);
Arif v. McGrath, Civil No. 71-1388 at 16-20 (W.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 1971).
85. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
86. Rhem v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-3962 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 21, 1971).
87. It is well settled that inmate claims of denials of constitutional rights are within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971).
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1971); Haines v. Kemer, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
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have the power, and even the duty, to step into a prison crisis to
remedy flagrant violations of inmates' constitutional rights at the
hands of prison officials. They have enjoined continuing physical
brutality by prison officials 88 and by other inmates as well.8 9 The
use of corporal punishment has been enjoined, 90 as have barbaric
forms of solitary confinement in "strip cells." 91 Federal courts
have also acted in cases of alleged racial discrimination, 92 degrad-
ing and inhuman prison conditions,93 disciplinary procedures
which violated constitutional due process,94 denials of access to
the courts,95 and interference with freedom of speech 96 or re-
ligion. 7
However, there is a great difference between successfully in-
voking federal jurisdiction and establishing the right to relief.
Although in cases involving first amendment rights courts have
generally required prison officials to produce substantial justifi-
(1969); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Inmates of Attica; Landman v. Peyton,
370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966). It is also clear that exhaustion of remedies is inappropriate
in these cases. Wilwording v. Swenson, 92 S. Ct. 407 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 892
U.S. 639 (1968); Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 167 (1961); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, No. 84567
(2d Cir., Jan. 25, 1972); Wright v. McMann, 887 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). And absten-
tion is unwarranted because there is generally never any need for construction of a state
statute so as to avoid a constitutional question. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 438
(1971); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, No. 34567 (2d Cir., Jan. 25, 1972); Wright v. McMann,
387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally Prisoner's Rights Under Section 1983, 6 Cium.
L. BULL. 287 (1970); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for
Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 28 STAN. L. REy. 478 (1971).
88. Inmates of Attica.
89. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1971).
90. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
91. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Sulip.
674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
92. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Washington v. Lee, 268 F.
Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 888 (1968).
98. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 823 F. Supp. 98
(N.D. Ohio 1971).
94. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Landman v. Royster, 888 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 828 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Bundy v.
Cannon, 828 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, - F.2d -
No. 71-1865 (6th Cir., Mar. 14, 1972).
95. Johnson v. Avery, 398 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 812 U.S. 546 (1941); Gilmore
v. Lynch, 819 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 92 S. Ct.
250 (1971).
96. E.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 826 F. Supp. 209 (D. Mass. 1971); Fortune Soc'y v.
McGinnis, 819 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
97. Cooper v. Pate, 878 U.S. 546 (1964); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 189 (2d Cir.
1971). See also Cruz v. Beto, 92 S. Ct. 1079 (Mar. 20, 1972).
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cation for restricting the rights of inmates,98 quite the contrary
approach has been taken in cases arising under the eighth amend-
ment where a heavier burden is placed on inmates. Since in a
prison crisis, reliance will generally be placed upon the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,
plaintiffs must be prepared to make a strong factual showing.
Although outright beatings and physical torture clearly vio-
late the eighth amendment, 9 other forms of official conduct which
can be labelled "punishment" may be insulated from constitu-
tional attack:
For a federal court, however, to place a punishment beyond
the power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference
with the state's free political and administrative processes. It is not
only that we, trained as judges, lack expertise in prison adminis-
tration. Even a lifetime of study in prison administration and sev-
eral advanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a federal
court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have
decided is suitable because to us the choice may seem unsound or
personally repugnant. 1o
Thus, courts have held that punishments violate the eighth
amendment only in extreme cases. 10 1 The plaintiff in Wright v.
McMann, for example, was placed unclothed in an unheated cell
in freezing weather without soap or toilet paper. Such punish-
ment was held to
destroy completely the spirit and undermine the sanity of the pris-
oner. The Eighth Amendment forbids treatment so foul, so in-
human and so violative of the basic concepts of decency.102
Similarly, corporal punishment was held unconstitutional be-
cause it was degrading, counter-productive, subject to widespread
abuse by sadistic guards, and also offensive to contemporary stan-
98. "Only a compelling state interest centering about prison security, or a clear and
present danger of a breach of prison discipline, or some substantial interference with
orderly institutional administration can justify curtailment of a prisoner's constitutional
rights." Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
99. Inmates of Attica at 22-23.
100. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971).
101. E.g., In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889) (chaining inmate by neck; held
unconstitutional); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (no light or
ventilation; no regular toilet; no soap, towel, toilet paper; restricted diet; held unconstitu-
tional); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (similar to Hancock; plaintiff
naked, no bed; held unconstitutional).
102. 387 F.2d at 526.
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dards of decency as evidenced by the fact that it had already been
outlawed in all but two states. 0 3 However, punishments which
the courts have found to be "counter-productive as a correctional
measure," "personally abhorrent" and only "several notches
above those truly barbarous and inhumane conditions heretofore
condemned by ourselves and other courts as 'cruel and unusual,'"
have been held to be constitutional.'04
Similar difficulties will be encountered when the state asserts
reasons of security, particularly in the wake of a prison rebellion,
as justification for acts which might otherwise be held unconsti-
tutional. For example, in the name of security, officials have been
permitted to hold "suspected agitators" in administrative segre-
gation without hearings.0 5 Prison officials have been allowed to
keep inmates locked in their cells twenty-four hours a day, without
exercise, recreation, or family visits, and otherwise restrict inmate
privileges, when the officials' actions were taken as temporary
"security measures" following a prison rebellion. 0 6
Even after a clear constitutional violation has been estab-
lished, inmates may be required to show that there is a danger of
repetition of such conduct before injunctive relief will be
granted.'07 In determining the likelihood of repetition, a court
will consider whether there has been a widespread pattern of con-
duct or whether initial unlawful conduct has been followed by
harassment, and threats of repetition. The court will also con-
sider whether officials have taken adequate steps to prevent a
recurrence. 08 However, once a danger of repetition has been es-
tablished, the courts has a duty to act.0 9
103. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968).
104. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Ford v. Board of
Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969) (no running water or wash bowl; bread and water
diet except one regular meal each third day; held constitutional); Landman v. Peyton, 370
F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967) (diet of bread and water for two
days, two meals on third day; no tooth brush or personal items; tear gas used; held consti-
tutional); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971) (400 days segregation; held constitutional).
105. Inmates of Greenhaven v. Zelker, Civil No. 71-6476 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 15, 1971).
106. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 684-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Edwards v.
Sard, 250 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D.D.C. 1966).
107. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); Inmates of Attica at
23-25; Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970); Valvano v. McGrath, Civil No. 70-
1390 at 27-28 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 11, 1971); Cender v. Lindsay, Civil No. 70-1225 (E.D.N.Y.,
Nov. 23, 1970).
108. Inmates of Attica at 23-25.
109. Id. at 22; United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Even without proof of likely repetition, it can be argued
that in cases of particularly egregious violations of inmates' rights
by prison officials, the courts should act if only to condemn the
violations.110
It is of the highest importance to community morale that the courts
shall give firm and effective reassurance, especially to those who feel
that they have been harassed by reason of their color or their
poverty."1
Such reassurance by federal courts is particularly important in
cases involving prisoners, who have so few legitimate avenues for
the presentation of their grievances.
CONCLUSION
Recent history has taught us that the manner in which state
and prison officials respond to intolerable prison conditions and
inmate disturbances protesting such conditions requires that law-
yers be equipped to deal with the crises that ensue. The legal
efforts made on behalf of prisoners caught up in a crisis may pro-
duce results ranging from changes in prison conditions to the
saving of life and limb.
From the brief survey of case law presented above, it can be
anticipated that inmates in a crisis situation may have unusual
difficulty in establishing the right to relief in a federal court.
Therefore, despite the pressures of time, lack of resources and
the need for prompt action, able handling of a prison crisis law-
suit through planning, preparation, ingenuity and appreciation
of the complexities of federal litigation is essential and should in-
crease the chances for positive results.
110. Strasser v. Doorley, 309 F. Supp. 716, 725-26 (D.R.I. 1970) (declaratory relief on
the basis of one incident of unconstitutional police conduct).
111. Lankford v. Geiston, 364 F.2d 197, 204 (4th Cir. 1966).
